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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine issues and concerns resulting
from the utilization of containers to transport unit equipment during
surge phase deployments and to appraise transportation decision-makers of
potential problem areas. This thesis provides an overview of container
operations during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It examines the
effects of containerization of unit equipment on unit integrity from both
the unit commander and the transportation provider perspectives. It
examines container policy, availability and supply, and militarily useful
configurations. The use of procured and leased containers is examined and
potential costs and benefits associated with each method, as well as the
effects on the container market as a whole, are assessed. Tracking capa-
bilities and visibility of in-transit containers are also examined from
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Military containerization is predominantly a one-way move-
ment from the United States to overseas bases and operat-
ing forces. For the most part, these requirements are
handled in peacetime by private containers and container-
ship services. Only in an emergency, such as a NATO or
Arabian Gulf conflict, would container problems become
acute. Department of Defense containers (such as MILVANs)
would be activated in the early stages of the emergency,
but their relatively limited numbers would require addi-
tional container capacity very quickly. (Saunders, 19 86)
A. BACKGROUND
In June 1920, the Jones Act was passed in order maintain
a Merchant Marine of the best -equipped and most suitable types
of vessels, sufficient to carry the greater portion of Ameri-
can commerce and to be owned and operated by U.S. citizens.
(Stopford, p. 143)
The Jones Act was a manifestation of the belief that
transportation is a vital element in ensuring the nation's
defense. The military must be able to move personnel and
equipment quickly, and as the act points out, efficiently and
effectively, using the vessels specified above. The United
States has relied on seapower since the Revolution to defend
and protect its national interests and commercial shipping has
always been a key player in this strategy.
Since the Jones Act was passed, four major national de-
fense crises have been contended with that required the exten-
sive use of commercial shipping assets. During the first
three of those, the "best -equipped and most suitable vessels"
were break -bulk because that is what was available in commer-
cial industry. That changed with Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Break-bulk ships were no longer the shipping
industry standard. Containerships had taken over the liner
routes due to their lower costs and greater capacity.
Strategic sealift transported between ninety and ninety
five percent of all dry cargo and ninety nine percent of
petroleum required for the Korean War, Vietnam, and Operations
Desert Shield and Storm (Sowers, 1991) . The vast majority of
this sealift was transported on commercial vessels. Prior to
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, dry cargo was
transported primarily in break-bulk ships.
Starting in the late 1960's, and throughout the 1970 's and
1980' s, break-bulk vessels were largely replaced by container-
ships due to the containerships' lower operating costs and
substantially increased productivity.
The shift to containerships transformed the makeup of the
United States Merchant Marine upon which the Department of
Defense depends for its strategic sealift. Some view contain-
ers as both economical and efficient. Others feel they are a
hirderance during a surge phase, when personnel and material
must be rapidly deployed, and containers are felt to be an
additional burden.
The Department of Defense has made past use of container
technology, but not nearly as drastically as has the commer-
cial market. The use of "containers" is not new to the mili-
tary. The CONEX box (short for Container Express) is a result
of attempting to solve pilferage and damage problems experi-
enced during World War II with small and high value items.
CONEX boxes are metal, are mounted on skids to allow use with
forklifts, and have recessed lifting eyes. They come in two
sizes: 6'3"W X 6'10"H X 4'3"L and 6'3"W X 6'10"W X 8'6"L.
(Sowers, 1991)
CONEX boxes were first used during the Korean Conflict,
and saw extensive use during the Vietnam War. In fact, CONEX
boxes were the "backbone of logistics support" during that
war. (Sowers, 1991) They were a great success as their con-
cept was to keep material together until it reached its desti-
nation. Unfortunately, most CONEX boxes are approaching the
end of their service lives and require replacement. [Jordan
24 th Infantry, interview, 1992]
In addition to CONEX boxes, MILVANs are also in use.
MILVANs conform to International Standards Organization (ISO)
container standards and are a 20 foot equivalent unit (TEU)
.
There are two types of MILVANs in the inventory, a dry cargo
version and a munitions version. MILVANs are also facing the
same problem as the CONEX box- -age- -and many are at the end of
their serviceable lives as well.
Both the CONEX box and MTLVAN were designed to have ready
access to mult i -modal transport and to be transported via
motor transport, rail, surface vessel, or aircraft. The
smaller of the CONEX boxes could also be moved by a gang of
soldiers, so it has a fourth transportation facet as well (for
very short distances) . Both the MILVAN and CONEX box are used
for the same reason as containers in the commercial market -
to avoid handling individual pieces of material and for pro-
tection of items from damage and pilferage. Coupled with this
shift, substantial political pressure has been brought to bear
to reduce the Department of Defense, especially overseas
bases, with the ending of the Cold War. The "peace dividend"
will most likely include the closure of many overseas bases of
operations and the stationing of previously forward- deployed
troops and capabilities in the Continental United States
(CONUS) . The CONUS based force structure is predicated on
rapid deployment to an Area of Operation (AO) . This new
policy underscores the need for rapid, effective and efficient
strategic sealift, especially in the initial, or surge, phase
of a deployment.
B . PROBLEM
Military cargo is comprised of the same basic elements it
was a half century ago: Combat, Combat Support, and Combat
Service Support. The hurdle facing modern logisticians is how
to transport unit equipment, normally break-bulk in nature,
using a Merchant Marine that now largely utilizes container-
ships to transport dry cargo. This thesis will explore sever-
al questions surrounding the potential use of containers to
transport unit equipment during the initial, or surge, phase
of a deployment. These questions include:
• What types of ships will be available from the Merchant
Marine in the future?
• Will unit commanders accede to use of containers?
• What effect does containerization have on unit integrity?
• What types of containers are most military useful and
necessary?
• How should containers be maintained? Leased? Owned?
• How will containers be tracked?
• What conditions could preclude container usage for a con-
tingency?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of the thesis will focus on the Army's use of
container technology because the Army is viewed as the major
consumer of sealift capability. Both the Air Force and the
Navy, including the Marine Corps, have indigenous lift and
container capabilities and, for the purpose of this thesis,
are viewed as logistically self-supporting.
This thesis will primarily be of an informational and
policy- oriented nature. It is envisioned that those who may
read or use it will be familiar with the technical terms and
language associated with both the transportation and container
fields
.
It will also assume that U.S. Merchant Marine vessels and
those under Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) will continue to
play an integral and vital part of any future sealift con-
tingency operation because of both fiscal budgeting and Na-
tional Defense considerations. While Military Sealift Command
has moved forward with procurement of additional Fast Sealift
Ships (FSS) and Strategic Sealift Ships (SSS) for the Ready
Reserve Fleet (RRF) , it is assumed that they will be used for
initial surge deployments of combat units, but will be signif-
icantly augmented shortly after the contingency arises for the
transportation of the other combat and combat support ele-
ments .
D . METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines the use of containers and container-
ships in the transportation of surge Combat, Combat Support,
and Combat Service Support requirements. A formulation of
future logistical operations utilizing container technologies
will be sought in order to enhance the efficient and effective
transfer of surge unit equipment to an AO.
A significant amount of information was obtained from
personal interviews with those individuals assigned to major
transportation commands who were involved in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm logistical planning and operations.
Information was obtained from United States commercial ship-
ping firms that provided container services. A large quantity
of written information such as reports, reviews and policy
proposals were obtained from U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM)
,
Headquarters, Military Transportation Management
Command (MTMC) and MTMC's Transportation Engineering Agency
(TEA)
.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II will provide an overview of container and
sealift capability used during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.
Chapter III will contain an examination of unit integrity,
unit commander concerns about unit integrity, as well as those
of transportation commands responsible for providing sealift.
Chapter IV will examine container policy, supply and
availability. It will examine container availability and
market force changes when the Department of Defense enters the
container market. Inventory questions will also be examined
with regard to owning/leasing and relying on industry.
Chapter V will discuss container configurations and exam-
ine militarily useful designs.
Chapter VI will examine tracking systems and the require-
ment to accurately trace and retriev2 containers as specified
by unit commanders
.
Chapter VII will be comprised of the conclusion and recom-
mendations for the future.
II. OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and captured that
country shortly thereafter. In response to the invasion, a
no-notice deployment to Southwest Asia was undertaken for the
purpose of liberating Kuwait. Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm saw the first large scale use of the commercial
container industry by the Department of Defense. Deployments
of material for a contingency of this size had not been under-
taken since the Vietnam War. The distance to the Area of
Operation (AO) was approximately 8700 nautical miles from U.S.
ports. Due to the immensity of the lift requirements and
distances involved, most of the nation's air and sealift
assets were extensively used. (Rost, Addams , Nelson, p. 1)
A. BACKGROUND
Desert Shield and Desert Storm logistical efforts were
divided into four phases. Phase I was the period 7 August
through 7 November 1990. This phase was characterized as
"Initial Deterrence". It was essentially a stopgap measure to
preclude further gains by Iraqi forces. Phase II was the
period 8 November 1990 through 15 January 1991. It was char-
acterized by a buildup of strength leading up to the offensive
stage. Phase III was the period 16 January through 28 Febru-
ary 1991. It was the offensive stage of the operation. Phase
IV was the period from 1 March 1991 forward. It was the
period of redeployment of equipment to homeports
.
Phases I and II were closely associated with "surge" de-
ployment of units. A surge is the initial stage of deployment
of equipment and personnel in a contingency operation. There
is no time period specifically designated as "surge", however,
the first fourteen to twenty one days have been used by some
activities. (Lennon, MTCM-TEA, Interview, Jul 1992) While
the entire period cannot be classified as wholly surge, there
were significant elements of it in both of the phases as the
strategy changed from one of defense to that of offense. It
is toward these two phases that focus will be directed.
During Phases I and II, 294 ships were involved in the
sealift of unit equipment and related support. (Rost, Addams,
Nelson, p. 3) :
• 25 ships of the Afloat Prepositioning Force, including all
13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) carrying Marine
equipment, 8 prepositioning (PREPO) ships carrying Army
and Air Force cargo, and 4 tankers in the PREPO force.
• 8 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)
.
• 70 Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships.
• 191 chartered dry cargo ships: 29 flying the U.S. flag or
under effective U.S. control (EUSC) , and 162 of foreign
flag and control.
Desert Shield and Desert Storm saw the most intensive
buildup and logistical efforts since Vietnam. Table 1 com-
pares rates for the last three major national contingencies.
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Table 1 DRY CARGO DELIVERED3 ' b BY AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
DURING THE THREE MAJOR CONFLICTS
Monthly rate c
(short tons)
First Year Peak Year
Operation Desert Shield/Storm 510,000
Vietnam Ward 153,000 523,000
Korean Ward 385, 000 400, 000
a. Sources for Desert Shield/Storm data are the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) . Southeast Asia
data are from OSD's Joint Logistics Review Board's 18-volume survey of
logistics in the Vietnam War [2] . Korean War data are from CINC-
PACFLT's periodic Evaluation Reports on U.S. Pacific Fleet operations
in the Korean War [3,4] .
b. Airlift data reflect deliveries by MAC or its predecessor, the
Military Air Transportation Service (MATS) . Sealift reflects MSC
deliveries or its predecessor, the Military Sea Transport Service
(MSTS) and includes all Navy- controlled U.S. and foreign charters.
In addition, the Desert Shield/Storm data include the contributions of
afloat prepositioned forces.
c. Monthly rates are an average of aggregate deliveries over a year
of less, depending on the availability of the data. For Desert
Shield/Storm the average is based on deliveries through 19 February
1991. For Southeast Asia, the first-year rate is the monthly average
over 1968. For Korea, the first-year rate is from July 1950 through
June 1951 for airlift and November 1950 through April 1951 for sea-
lift. The peak-year rate for Korea is from calendar 1952 by MSTS and
MATS.
d. Southeast Asia and Korean War sources used measurement tons for
sealift deliveries. For comparative purposes, these were converted to
short tons using a factor of 0.5 short ton per average measurement
ton
.
Source: Sealift in Operation Desert Shield/Storm: 7 August 1990 to
1 7 February 1991, Center for Naval Analysis
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Tables 2 and 3 provide comparative data on the sealift and
airlift portions of Phases I and II.
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B. JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING
In order to conduct military operations, it is essential
that detailed plans are prepared and ready for use, should a
contingency arise. One of the methods by which plans are
formulated is through Joint Operations Planning.
Joint operations planning includes contingency planning,
execution planning, and implementation planning. In peac-
etime, the planners prepare contingency plans, either when
directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or
12
to accomplish other missions not specifically assigned by
the CJCS but determined by the combatant commander to be
necessary. Joint operation plans tasked by the CJCS are
reviewed by the Joint Staff and approved by the CJCS . The
approved operation plans of the CINCs represent the na-
tional plans for major contingencies and transition to
war. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the joint oper-
ation plans are converted to joint operation orders and
implemented by the CINCs. During crisis situations, the
CINCs develop courses of action in response to specific
situations or taskings and prepare joint operation orders
to execute courses of action approved by the National
Command Authority (NCA) . (Talley and Vigneron, p. 7-8)
Operation Plans in Complete Format (OPLANs) are a complete
and detailed operation plan including a full description
of the concept of operations and all annexes applicable to
the plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional
support, and resources required to execute the plan and
provides estimates of final numbers and scheduling for
their movement into theater. The OPLAN can be used as the
basis for quickly developing an operations order. An
OPLAN is normally prepared when the contingency is criti-
cal to national secruity and would tax the total resources
available to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through
planning, or when detailed planning is reequired, to sup-
port alliance planning. (Talley and Vigneron. p. 9)
OPLANs have Time -Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)
associated with them. TPFDDs (Appendix B, AFSC Pub 1, 1991)
include data on:
• Units to be employed.
• Units to be deployed to support the OPLAN, with a priority
indicating desired sequence for their arrival at ports on
a given day.
• Routing of forces to be deployed.
• Mobility data associated with deploying forces.
• Non-unit -related personnel and cargo movements to be con-
ducted concurrently with deployment of forces.
The TPFDD is supposed to reflect the units, equipment,
material, and numbers of personnel which are required in order
13
to carry out the mission set forth in an OPLAN. Very often,
equipment and personnel changes are made regarding OPLANS
.
These changes are required to be entered into the TPFDD pro-
cess so that new TPFDDs can be generated reflecting the latest
changes
.
Because Desert Shield and Desert Storm did not fit any
available OPLAN, essentially a new TPFDD was built as the
situation unfolded. That reality, when coupled with the fact
that OPLANs have not been used in the last three contingencies
(Grenada, Panama, Desert Shield/Storm) , have many people ques-
tioning the usefulness of the process. (Fox, ODSCLOG, Inter-
view, Jul 1992) The OPLAN that most closely resembled Desert
Shield/Storm, OPLAN 1002-88, had been deemed "not transporta-
tion feasible" by the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) and "the successor plan -- OPLAN 1002-90 -- had
not been approved, nor had the TPFDD been examined for trans-
portation feasibility." It was nonetheless used as the "ap-
plicable directive for Desert Shield." (Rost, Addams , Nelson,
p 13)
The successor TPFDD caused significant problems for those
commands responsible for ensuring that the transportation
required by it was available. Military Sealift Command (MSC)
was tasked to ensure availability of sealift for TPFDD materi-
al that did not resemble what was actually going to the the-
ater. Both MSC and the Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC) had two significant difficulties with the new TPFDD:
14
It was inaccurate with respect to identification of units
to be lifted, their cargo requirements, and ports of em-
barkation. The problem was particularly severe with re-
spect to combat support and combat service support (CS/-
CSS) units. Literally hundreds of reserve units were
included in the TPFDD that were never alerted and never
called.
Dates specified for in- theater arrivals were unrealistic,
particularly in view of the fact that Desert Shield com-
menced with little warning time. (Rost, Addams, Nelson, p.
13)
Rost's findings were borne out in interview after inter-
view of MSC and MTMC personnel involved with this situation.
Input coming from the field through the Transportation Coordi-
nator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-
ACCIS) varied widely from the TPFDD- specif ied requirements.
Differences of 50 percent were not uncommon. (Fields, MSC-HQ,
Interview, Jul 1992) These differences had tremendous impact
on the ability of MSC to procure/coordinate the required
sealift assets. If the differences between the TPFDD require-
ments and those coming in from the field through the TCACCIS
reporting system were within 10 percent, a lift was scheduled.
Even with that policy, many vessels sailed partially filled
because of this situation. In many cases, the actual amount
of lift required was not determined until the units were ready
to move, or in some cases, when they actually reached the Port
of Embarkation (POE) . Growth in equipment was tremendous as
unit vehicles went out combat loaded because of the possibili-
ty of having to fight coming directly off the ships. Addi-
15
tionally, MSC performance was being gauged against performance
parameters of the TPFDD for OPLAN 1002-90, which was inaccu-
rate to begin with. (Fields, MSC,HQ, Interview, Jul 1992)
C. READY RESERVE FORCE
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is an integral part of the
surge deployment process. Its purpose is to ensure sealift is
available for a contingency. Depending on the size of the
contingency, the RRF can be augmented with commercial vessels
that are chartered or requisitioned by MSC. Vessels in the
RRF are designed to be ready for activation and available for
lift within certain timeframes from the date of callup. Once
activated, they would be used to transport Unit Equipment to
the Area of Operation. Desert Shield and Desert Storm were
the first actual tests of the RRF in some time.
The initial performance of RRF vessels indicates that the
use of containerships could have been an immense aid in get-
ting the surge forces deployed quicker. As shown in Figures
1 and 2, the RRF ships that were activated were not available
as designed, due in part to their age and material condition.
(Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Mitre Corp, May 1991)
MSC's contingency response (CORE) program did not incorpo-
rate the commercial shipping industry. Both MTMC and MAC
contingency programs do involve commercial carriers. The
effect of this lack of incorporation was a factor in having no




Figure 1 RRF Performance August 2-31, 1990
Source: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Mitre Corporation
three weeks following the Iraqi invasion. (American President
Lines, White Paper, May, 1991) This placed additional pres-
sure on the RRF, FSS's, prepositioned ships and military-
aircraft already in place.
D . PHASES
Because Desert Shield and Desert Storm were no notice de-
ployments and there was no exact OPLAN that fit the scenario,
the response to the crisis and logistical efforts made were
put together as the situation developed. Phase I can be
differentiated from Phase II in its planning. Phase I was









Figure 2 RRF performance September 1, 1990 - January 28, 1991
Source: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Mitre Corporation
any of the 'off the shelf OPLANs . Phase I was characterized
by rapidly escalating increases in requirements, as shown in
Figure 3. Requirements nearly trebled between C+9 and C+48.
The OPLAN that was followed was the best, one that approxi-
mated the actual situation. During this phase, four Army
divisions, a Marine Expeditionary Force, roughly 1,000 combat
aircraft, 60 Navy ships and 240,000 personnel were transported
to Southwest Asia. Phase II had more planning because there
was time available to react in a more methodic manner. Table




Figure 3 Sealift requirements for August and September
Source: Sealift in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm:
7 August 1990 to 17 Fegruary 1991, Center for Naval Analysis
Figure 4 displays the Dry Cargo Profile for cargo moved during
phases I and II.
E. CONTAINERIZATION
Containers were used for the transportation of both surge
and sustainment material. The containers used during the
initial surge were virtually all military owned containers.
However, the vast majority of containers were used in the
sustainment role. These containers were commercially owned
19
Table 4 SHIP UTILIZATION IN PHASES I AND II
Charters
MPS PREPO FSS RRF U.S. Foreign





























Source: Sealift in Operation Desert Shie




containers carried on commercial routes. Approximately 20
percent of the dry cargo tons transported during Desert Shield
and Desert Storm were containerized. Figure 5 illustrates the
sealift and airlift of that dry cargo.
Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, Military Sealift Command
contacted U.S. -flag liner operators and invited them to a
meeting at MSC to discuss terms of contracts in support of
Desert Shield. Negotiations commenced shortly thereafter.
The Special Mideast Service Agreement (SMESA) resulted. The
SMESA established "rates and terms of shipping containerized
supplies from origin to destination, " however bookings did not
start for three weeks while the SMESA was organized. (Lennon,
MTMC-TEA, Interview, Jul 1992)
The volume of military container traffic in the early
weeks after bookings commenced was 250-300 FEU's per week.
20
































Figure 4 Desert Shield Dry Cargo Profile
Source: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Mitre Corporation
This rose to 3,300 FEU's by early February 1991. Volume
forecasting by the military was difficult because of the
unknown nature of the contingency. This resulted in "no- show
or late-show cargo" bookings that ran as high as 25 percent.
(American President Lines, May 1991)
One of the hurdles faced by commercial carriers was the
need to submit "lengthy filings" each time they wanted to
adjust the "size and deployment of feeder and line-haul"
services that were in support of military requirements.
Granted these filings were rapidly approved by the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) , however the time required., which was
not insignificant, for this administrative requirement could
21
Date
G Sea I ift + Am- i if t
Figure 5 Dry Cargo Lift during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Source: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Mitre Corporation
have been spent more productively. (American President Lines,
1991) Additionally, while the carriers were preparing the
petitions and waiting for approval, foreign carriers were
chartered because of a lack of available shipping.
By March 1991, approximately 37,000 FEU's had been shipped
to Southwest Asia under the SMESA since the beginning of
Desert Shield. MTMC reported that 30,000 of that total were
eventually redeployed to homeports, unopened. MTMC also
reported [Priber, MTMCHQ, Interview, May 1992] the top three
commodities shipped in containers to have been (in order)
:
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Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) shipped foodstuffs (50 per-
cent of total)
Army/Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) material
Army Depot material
During the initial surge period in Phases I and II, a
large majority of unit equipment that could have been contain-
erized -was loaded into unit vehicles and transported in that
manner. Additionally, many vehicles were lifted with full
combat loads because of the fear of having to fight virtually
from the time they were debarked in Saudi Arabia. This extra
weight was not a major problem from the sealift point of view.
Load planning had been done, in large part, based on less than
fully weighted vehicles. When vehicles arrived fully loaded
the load plans had to be quickly changed. Combat loaded vehi-
cles may become the future norm, especially in light of de-
clining future sealift capacity. Fully loaded vehicles would
save time in the early, vital stages of a contingency.
As the statement of Saunders in the introduction of this
thesis suggested, the Army's own supply of containers was, in
fact, soon depleted. This necessitated the procurement of
commercial containers. Many of the Transportation Officers
interviewed stated once their containers were used, there was
a period where commercial containers were procured from every
source possible, in whatever size was available.
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Because units normally operated with relatively small
numbers of containers, the quantity of Material Handling
Equipment (MHE)
,
such as chassis and tractors, was also corre-
spondingly small. During the period of rapid deployment when
additional containers were urgently required and procured, the
lack of MHE became a problem. As an example, the Transporta-
tion Officer for the 82nd Airborne stated his unit normally
had six to seven chassis to handle the normal contingent of
forty containers. The containers fleet soon increased to over
200
,
yet the quantity of MHE remained unchanged. (Fredo,
Interview, May 1992) This restricted the ability of the unit
to handle containers and slowed rather than speeded their use.
The problem of insufficient MHE was also experienced on
the discharge end in Southwest Asia. The port facilities in
Saudi Arabia were state of the art and containers were dis-
charged quite efficiently from the commercial vessels, however
the same lack of MHE caused bottlenecks to occur. The MHE
problem was further exacerbated because Combat Supply Support
(CSS) equipment that would have been available to move the
containers was too low a priority on the TPFDD and "higher
priority" equipment moved ahead of it. The lack of chassis,
tractors and drivers would become acute, and the immediate
port areas experienced heavy buildups of containers. Because
both the military and the commercial carriers had significant
requirements for MHE and drivers, the two ultimately competed
with each other for these critical resources, thereby driving
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up the contract cost for both parties. (American President
Lines, p. 5 Statement, May 1991)
Another significant problem faced was the identification
of container contents. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
many containers were manifested as "N.O.S" (Not Otherwise
Specified) or "Food". (American President Lines, White Paper,
May, 1991) Documentation did not keep pace with the contain-
ers. Most containers arrived in theater ahead of the documen-
tation. (Lennon, MTMC-TEA, Interview, July 1992) This caused
additional bottlenecks until containers could be opened to
determine contents and destination. This problem ultimately
caused an "operational failure" at the port of Dammam. The
port was closed for eleven days to open containers in order to
determine disposition. This occurrence highlights the effec-
tiveness of the commercial container industry's delivery
system and the hurdles the military would face incorporating




Army Regulation AR-56-4 states:
Maintain unit integrity by keeping a unit's equipment in
the same container or the same ship.
Unit integrity is the basic desire of commanders to keep
elements of their units in close proximity to each other
during deployment so those elements may be quickly reconsti-
tuted into an battle- ready fighting force, with a minimum of
disruption or loss of effectiveness. Unit integrity is a
quite necessary, valid and crucial element in deployment of
military units.
The ability to rapidly reconstitute contingency forces is
critical to the success or failure of a mission. The inabili-
ty to rapidly reconstitute forces can cause delays in battle
readiness and allow for a degradation or loss of military
momentum or advantage. A problem arises, however, because
each unit commander envisions unit integrity differently.
Consequently, the requirements for maintaining unit integrity
will also differ from unit to unit.
B. UNIT COMMANDER CONCERNS
Unit commanders are especially concerned about the abili-
ty to have their unit arrive at the Port of Debarkation (POD)
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relatively intact. They are also extremely concerned with in-
transit visibility of their equipment. Breaking units apart
into several elements and the resultant loss of control,
coupled with poor visibility of these shipment elements, is
naturally stressful to the commander. Acting upon these
concerns, unit commanders may pressure transportation pro-
viders to tailor the deployment around the unit, in order to
ensure it arrives intact and before other units. However,
this intervention can result in the suboptimization of avail-
able lift capacity.
Suboptimization can take the form of a reluctance to
containerize equipment in order to avoid the dispersion and
subsequent loss of control. This can lead to vehicles being
heavier than planned, which could cause load plans to be
changed to lower the number of vehicles carried because of the
increased weight. Suboptimization can also precipitate re-
quests for units to be transported on specific vessels. Not
matching the cargo with the best vessel can cause the vessel
to sail with unused capacity. Both lend themselves to the
inefficient usage of square footage on available bottoms and
should be avoided, although the incentive is strong to sub-
optimize in order to maintain "unit integrity."
The fullest optimization of RRF resources will be critical
to the success of "the smaller, CONUS-based force, called the
Contingency Corps, which will consist of only five divisions."
(Sowers, quoting General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, statement
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to Congress, March 1991) Reduction in forces will in turn
cause sealift assets to decline. Rapid deployment forces used
Roll -On/Roll -Of f (RORO) vessels heavily during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but these vessels are being re-
placed by containerships in commercial industry and will not
be available in the future in significant quantities ( Tippet t,
MSC, Interview, Jul 1992) . Unit commanders must become famil-
iar with the capabilities and restrictions of the RRF and on
the need to fully capitalize on the RRF's and the container
industry's capacity to move material on strategic missions.
C. PERCENT OF EQUIPMENT CONTAINERIZABLE
Units are divided into three basic groupings:
• Combat (CU) - Infantry, Armor, Artillery
• Combat Support (CS) - Intelligence, Communication, Mili-
tary Police
• Combat Service Support (CSS) - Quartermaster, Transporta-
tion, Maintenance
Unit equipment comes in various sizes and configurations.
Some of it easily lends itself to containerization while some
of it does not. Combat units normally have low percentages of
containerizable equipment, while Combat Service Support units
have much higher percentages
.
While Combat units are envisioned as having low percentag-
es of containerizable equipment, significant gains can be made
in the optimization of shipping bottoms if containers are used
by all unit groupings. For example, an Infantry battalion
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with the minimum amount of material containerized requires
1,110,010 square feet of shipping space. With the maximum
amount of material containerized, the space required shrinks
to 786,000 square feet. (Trosclair, JCS, Interview, Jan 1993)
As seen in Table 5 (Sower, 1991) , considerable gains can
be made when utilizing container technology in deployments
even for Combat units. Containers can add to unit integrity
through the reduction in square footage required, however
units must be equipped to be able to handle containers if the
benefits of container technology are to be gained. The abili-
ty to handle containers and quickly assemble into a fighting
unit will be critical.











































* Commercial - 8 feet high and 26-40 long tons
# Heavy Duty - 13 feet high and 60 lony tons
Source: MTMCTEA Study OA 88-5C-18. Analysis of Containerization on
Unit Strategic Deplo/ment (As of November 1988)
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D. UNIT INTEGRITY ISSUES DURING DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT
STORM
USTRANSCOM reported (Zak, Interview, May 1992) the four
major transportation problems of Desert Storm to be:
(1) Unit Equipment
(2) Loss of Control
(3) Missing Equipment
(4) Lack of Faith in the "System"
Unit commanders realized early in the conflict they faced
the possibility of having to fight coming directly off sealift
vessels. They naturally wanted to have that capability.
Breaking units into different elements to allow for transport
would endanger that ability in the eyes of some. Some com-
manders did not trust "the system" to deliver their material,
when required, or on time. This created incentive for unit
commanders to intervene in the transportation process. The
type of intervention described in Section B above was experi-
enced by Installation and Unit Transportation Officers and
Military Sealift Command.
Unit integrity was a concern to transportation commands as
well. Incidents of operational commands directing transpor-
tation commands how to move units did occur. This interven-
tion is as frustrating to the transportation commands as it is
to the unit commander. As stated by Mr. Burns of MSC, London
to Sowers, "Does the Army want the transportation services, or
do they want the ship?" (Sowers, 1991) While specific ship
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types may be ideal for certain units, intervention could have
unfavorable effects on future surge movements because of the
anticipated decline in capacity.
While many commanders felt that unit integrity was at risk
during the overseas lift segment of their deployment, problems
were experienced in CONUS prior to leaving. The rapid loading
of materials without complete documentation caused those mate-
rials to lose visibility. As Reserve units were activated and
reported for service, some were used in their support capacity
to load containers - something they had not had any signifi-
cant experience doing. (Fredo, 82nd Airborne, Interview, May
1992) Their effort was Herculean, but because this type of
deployment had not been regularly drilled, its hurried nature
lent to material visibility problems.
Movement from the unit's home base to the Port of Embar-
kation (POE) also contributed to the degradation of unit
integrity. Railroads played a critical role in getting units
to the POE. Because of the very short nature of the crisis,
railroads did not have sufficient capacity to handle the
initial surge. (Jordon, 24 th Infantry, Interview, May 1992)
This necessitated rapid augmentation by truck. If items were
"roadable, " they went by truck to the POE to join the heavier
equipment coming in by rail. When this factor is combined
with: (1) obtaining containers from whatever source could
supply them, (2) lack of material handling equipment and (3)
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less than full documentation of contents, unit integrity was
degraded in most cases before it ever arrived at the POE
.
E. CONTAINERS AND SURGE DEPLCJfMENTS
1. Strategic and Unit -Owned Containers
Containers are classified into one of two categories,
as either "strategic" or "unit-owned." Strategic containers
are "permanent" containers used to transport material and are
then "recycled" into the transportation "system" container
fleet. These containers are viewed simply as "platforms" for
the movement of material. "System" containers could be com-
mercially leased or Government -owned. Unit -owned containers
are containers that remain with a unit throughout the employ-
ment of that unit. The container deploys with the unit, is
transported with the unit on the mission, and is then rede-
ployed with the unit at the end of the mission. (Sowers,
1991)
Each class of container fills a recognized niche.
Strategic containers are well suited for the sustainment role.
Unit containers are better suited for the surge role. As
evidenced by the use of CONEX boxes during the Korean and
Vietnam conflicts, unit-owned containers can significantly add
to the operational flexibility of a unit, because they are
readily at hand when the deployment order is received and can
double as temporary storage facilities.
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2. Container Mission
The specific mission for containers during surge
deployments is still being debated. The need for rapid force
reconstitution at the POD is recognized and critical. Because
of this debate and the strategic necessity of quickly marshal-
ling forces, the exact nature of the employment of containers
remains uncertain. What is clear at this point is that con-
tainers will be needed quickly during this phase.
As evidenced by the amount of time required to bring
container service on line during Desert Shield, units will
have to maintain inventories of containers in order to be able
to respond to crisis situations. A significant hurdle faced
by planners is deciding if support and reinforcement should
occur earlier or later in the deployment process. In all
likelihood, forces will have to take large supplies of materi-
al with them in the initial surge. Containers will have a
critical role, thereby making containerization a critical ele-
ment of the surge deployement. To further complicate surge
deployments, the size and availability of future containership
assets is a major concern.
The use of containers, seasheds and fla tracks is
becoming increasingly recognized as a way to increase the
amount of unit equipment able to be transported on container-
ships or vessels equipped to carry containers in addition to
other cargo. For equipment to be deployed by container or
equivalent, it must first be classified as containerizable
.
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The effect of classifying equipment as not containerizable be-
cause of unit integrity concerns when, in fact, the equipment
actually is containerizable, restricts both the type of vessel
the equipment is able to be transported on and the degrees of
freedom for the transportation providers, and may, ironically,
reduce unit integrity.
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TV. CONTAINER "POLICY, SUPPLY AND AVAILABILITY
Whether or not commercial containers are applicable for
military use during surge deployments is an important ques-
tion. An equally important question is how best to maintain
access to containers during those periods. Options include
purchasing containers, rental/lease type arrangements or some
combination of the two.
This chapter examines current DoD and Army container
policy and the availability and supply of containers and how
it relates to surge deployments. The chapter also examines
these areas from a commercial carrier perspective in order to
provide a more complete picture.
A. POLICY
1. Department of Defense Directives
There are a number of directives regarding DoD con-
tainer policy. Each Service tailors its container policy to
its specific situation. This thesis utilized two directives.
The first was Department of Defense Instruction 4500.37,
Management of the DoD Intermodal Container System, dated 2
April 1987. It pertained to overall DoD container policy.
The second was Army Regulation 56-4, Management of Army Inter-
modal Container System, effective 1 October 1990, more common
-
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ly known as AR-56-4. It pertained to the Army's container
policy. The focus on these two directives is based on the
assumption that the Navy and Air Force are self-sustaining and
that the Army is the major consumer of containers.
Army Regulation 56-4 promulgates "policies and command
responsibilities for the use of intermodal assets to optimize
the use of strategic sealift and improve force closure time,
that is, the time to move the force to the port of debarkation
(POD)" (Army Regulation 56-4, Management of Army Intermodal
Container Systems, p. 1, 1 Oct 1990) It directs the Army's
containerization efforts be guided by the following princi-
ples :
a. Optimize the containerization of Army unit equipment
(UE) to reduce force closure time, to meet the needs of
the supported theater commander-in-chief, and to reduce
transportation costs.
b. The 20 foot long by 8% foot high by 8 foot wide ANSI
and ISO container is the primary size container for unit
equipment shipments. Larger containers may be used in
contingency or mobilization operations. However, user
capability to handle and transport these containers shall
be the overriding consideration; for example, what is the
availability or capacity of container-handling equipment?
c. Stuff (load) Army UE in containers at origin or near-
est containerization consolidation point.
d. Stuff all sustainment items (resupply) at origin, for
example, depot, contractor facility, or containerization
consolidation point.
e. Design Army transportation infrastructure and assets
to supplement commercial container transportation capabil-
ity and ensure origin-to-destination handling ability.
f. Achieve rapid and forward container unstuffing (un-
loading) and the return (retrograde) of containers.
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g. Develop doctrine and rrain for contamerization at all
levels.
h. Maintain ANSI/ISO container standards to ensure com-




Containers and associated equipment may be procured or
leased under conditions established in DoD Directive 4500-
.37.
j . Use containers in peacetime to train for transition to
war, to meet mission requirements, and to reduce transpor-
tation costs.
DoD Instruction 4500.37 states:
1. DoD Components attain and maintain a container-orient-
ed distribution system of sufficient capability to meet
DoD-established mobilization and deployment goals while
ensuring commonality and interchangeability of intermodal
containers, hardware, and equipment between the Military
Services and commercial industry, which collectively con-
stitute the DoD container-oriented distribution system.
The container- oriented distribution system must interface
with and complement the movement and control of all other
noncontainerized DoD cargo.
2. DoD policy is to rely on the use of intermodal con-
tainer resources and services furnished by the commercial
transportation industry when doing so is responsive to
military requirements.
3. Containerized shipment shall be the preferred method,
unless cost effectiveness or peculiar shipment require-
ments are an overriding factor. (DoD Instruction 4500.37,
Management of the DoD Intermodal Container System, 2 April
1987)
DoD Instruction 4500.37 directs that each Military
Service prepare plans "for containerization actions" they have
or will be assigned. Table 6 summarizes container programs
and responsible DoD components assigned by DoD Instruction
4500.37. Each of the Services is responsible "for the funding
of assigned programs" and is required to update their contain-
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Table 6 PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
PROGRAM TITLE RESPONSIBLE DoD COMPONENT
Air Movement Plan Department of Air Force
Containerized Ammunition Department of Army
Distribution Plan (CAD)
Seashed Program Management Department of Navy
Plan
Offshore Discharge of Con- Department of Army and
tainers/Logistics over Navy
the Shore (OSDOC/LOTS) Pro-
gram Management Plan
Container Systems Hardware Department of Army
Status Report
Container Requirements and Department of Army
Availability Study
Source: Department of Defense Instruction 4500.37 dated April 2,
1987 , enclosure (4)
.
erization plans annually as of 31 December. Specific program
updates and briefings must be provided annually to the Direc-
tor of Transportation Policy, OUSD (A) and members of the
Defense Transportation Policy Committee.
2. Industry Perspective
The NSIA/NDTA Strategic Mobility Conference late last year
concluded "the recently published DoD container intermodal
policy has triggered a number of questions from industry"
which include:
• Inadequate 2 foot TEU inventory
• Inability to locate container assets
• No mobilization plan in or outside of CONUS for containers
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• Lack of chassis and related support equipment. (Richard
Lidinsky, Statement to House Commission on Merchant Marine
and Defense, May 1988)
Each of these potential trouble areas were experienced
by the Department of Defense during Operation Desert Shield.
The experiences of the British armed forces were also similar
during the Falklands campaign with regard to their use of
containers and containerships
.
All container companies contacted by this author
echoed the need to streamline the contracting process so that
in times of a national emergency container usage may be
brought on line immediately. "In time of national emergency,
strategic sealift materials must not await issuance, amend-
ment, submissions, and awards under a 73 -page long container
equipment lease process" (Lidinsky, May 1988) . In May 1991,
the Vice President for Government Affairs, American President
Lines (APL) , testified before Congress and spoke of the need
for the government
:
• To improve the peacetime procurement of ocean shipping
services in order to truly support integrated intermodal
networks
.
• To establish wartime procurement contingency plans in
order to make immediate use of commercial intermodal net-
works .
• To work with industry to maximize use of the liner sector
during all phases of national emergencies (Michael Mur-
phy, Testimony to House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, May 1991) .
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B. CONTAINER SUPPLY
A review of all current military container oriented liter-
ature indicates conflicting roles for the container. One
debate will focus on whether containers should be used at
all in strategic sealift efforts, while other commentators
are concerned about the containers most appropriate to our
sealift efforts- -yet all commentators never address the
more basic question of adequate container supply. (Rich-
ard Lidinsky, Statement of Sea Containers of America, Inc
to the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense . May 24,
1988)
The statement of Mr. Lidinsky summarized the current
container debate rather succinctly. Previous chapters of this
thesis discussed problems with container usage and unit integ-
rity, and the strong incentives not to containerize surge
forces. The concept of container usage has generally been
accepted, especially with regards to ammunition, however the
supply and availability of containers needs to examined.
Mr. Lidinsky further stated:
At least in budgetary terms, strategic sealift containers
seem to refer to seasheds and flatracks. Our company has
opposed the construction and development of seasheds,
believing they fail to meet the key criteria in sealift
mobilization scenarios- -rapid and reasonable production,
trouble free storage, useable on all vessels, and easily
transported from and returned to our shores.
Mr. Lidinsky' s sentiments was substantiated by Sowers
(Sowers, p. 35, 1991)
:
Unfortunately, even after the development, procurement,
and strategic national placement of the 1,500 SEASHEDs and
3,500 FLATRACKs (at a cost of 40 million dollars) not a
single containership was modified with this equipment in
order to deploy outsized unit equipment during Desert
Shield! The biggest reason for not using commercial con-
tainerships was the fact that the military could not af-
ford to take the time to modify the ships after mobiliza-
tion began. . . Once the crisis had developed, however, ship
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repair facilities were unavailable to perform the required
modifications in the time that could be allowed.
DoD Instruction 4500.37 is quite clear that the majority
of containers will come from the commercial sector, unless
military needs dictate otherwise. This policy is in line with
the Jones Act of utilizing the Merchant Marine to carry DoD
cargo. But relying on the commercial sector to pick up surge
and sustainment container movements may be "false reliance on
the private sector for container stockpiles that do not ex-
ist." For example, Sea Containers America, Inc. calculated on
a specific day it had less than 350 flatracks available to
lease to DoD out of a total flatrack inventory of 20,500.
(Richard Lidinsky, Statement to House Commission on Merchant
Marine and Defense, May 19 88)
It has been accepted that DoD will have to maintain an
inventory of containers for immediate access in a contingency,
but relying heavily on the commercial sector to quickly and
readily pick up the slack may not be realistic. To make
reasonable decisions, military planners must have some sort of
visibility of the commercial market and not assume industry
will be available to assist immediately. Some in the commer-
cial sector have advocated military visibility of commercial
assets through a reporting system for containers, or for DoD
to have a right of "first call" on container assets.
The extent to which DoD may rely on the commercial sector
was noted by Richard Lidinsky in his statement to the Commis-
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sion on Merchant Marine and Defense when he quoted a revealing
comment made by Maryland Congresswoman Helen D. Bently in 19 8 7
when she said, "The Pentagon estimates a 125,000 cargo con-
tainer need, but has less than 15,000 containers." The DoD
container inventory has increased in the intervening years,
but a large number of containers were obtained during Desert
Storm through the incurring of detention and demurrage charges
(CDR Brown, MTMCHQ, Interview, Jul 1992) , which made their
purchase the least cost method of paying the owners. Addi-
tionally, 10,000 commercial twenty foot containers were spe-
cifically purchased for Southwest Asia ammunition retrograde
(HQDA Washington D.C. Army Message, Subject: Management and
Disposition of Newly Procured Commercial Containers, 171800Z
Jul 91) . Even with these additional containers, the need will
still be large.
Michael Murphy of American President Lines noted in his
testimony in May 1991 before the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries that:
The United States had to use all of its 25 afloat preposi-
tioned vessels. All of its 8 fast sealift ships. The
U.S. also had to break out, activate and find crews to man
71 Ready Reserve Fleet vessels. . .Finally, the military had
to use up to one- third of the capacity of American U.S.
flag containership operators ... Even with all of these
resources, the U.S. still needed to charter foreign- flag
vessels. (Michael Murphy, U.S. Capability to Meet Future
Sealift Requirements
. Statement to the House Committee on
Merchant Marine & Fisheries, May 1991)
In supporting DoD contingency operations, transportation
carriers, especially ocean liner firms, may encounter finan-
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cial hurdles that could hinder their ability to conduct com-
mercial operations as they had done prior to the contingency.
They may unintentionally be required to financially support
DoD operations for periods of time until they are reimbursed.
The sums will not be small. The money required to sustain DoD
operations is substantial and companies may not be financially
able to conduct those operations and simultaneously continue
their commercial requirements if they are not paid promptly
for their services. They would, in effect, be loaning the
government money. American President Lines' experience during
Desert Shield/Storm is a good example of the burden that may
be placed on carriers. Mr. Murphy stated that APL "was able
to sustain financially the effort where, at one point, we had
advanced over $23 million on the government's behalf."
C. CONTAINER AVAILABILITY
At present, the worldwide container inventory is approxi-
mately 7,300,000 TEU's. Twenty foot and forty foot containers
complying with ISO standards make up 97.5 percent of the total
(Porter, Journal of Commerce Staff, Dec 21, 1992) . In 1987,
the average age of a "standard box" was reported to be 10
years, with "many as old as 12 or 14 years" (Martin, Lease
vs. Buy: The Container Option, Container News, June 1989).
The 19 87 average remains approximately the current average
age. Mr. George Saunders of Military Sealift Command (MSC)
reports the average life of a container to be approximately
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thirty years, but that they may still be useful for periods of
up to five years past that point in time. FORSCOM reported
"experience with MILVANS indicates a 15 to 20 year expected
life" and they would "be replaced only as required." (Draft
FORSCOM Container Action Plan, 1992) In the last several
years, leasing companies have increased their inventories 30
percent while the shipping companies have increased their
inventories by 20 percent. (George Saunders, MSC HQ, Tele-
phone conversation, February 1993)
The general availability of containers does not appear to
be a problem. Rather, it is the timeliness of the availabili-
ty that is of concern. Mr. Saunders stated that the supply of
containers was much like the supply of automobiles in the
United States - exceptionally large. No shortage of contain-
ers is envisioned; however, the commercial container utiliza-
tion rate is a significant factor in the availability of
containers for DoD use in a contingency. Equipment utiliza-
tion rates of 94 to 96 percent in the commercial sector have
been common in recent years (Martin, Lease vs. Buy: The Con-
tainer Option, Container News, June 1989). The Special Mid-
east Service Agreement (SMESA) containers were all unused
capacity of the commercial market because of a downturn in the
shipping market. Had the market been operating at the high
utilization percentages, the container picture could have much
different for Desert Shield and Storm.
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As evidenced by the experiences of the early deployers in
the first stages of mobilization in support of Desert Shield,
there was substantial demand for containers as units' contain-
er inventories were rapidly exhausted. They quickly turned to
commercial carriers to help with the excess. These requests
took time to complete and many units were actually competing
with each other to buy or lease the very same containers,
thereby driving up the price (Lennon, MTMC-TEA, Interview, Mar
1993) . After inspection, a portion of the containers received
were judged to be in poor material condition (Interviews with
Transportation Officers of the 24 th Infantry, 101 st Airborne
and 82 nd Airborne) . Only 50 percent of the containers slated
to be used for ammunition could pass the International Mari-
time Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code inspection (Lennon, MTMC-TEA,
Interview, Mar 1993) . The time required by the carrier to
gather the needed containers could explain the initial delay
in response and poor condition of the immediately available
containers because the containers in the best condition would
be in service, while those in poorer condition are held back,
however it does appear in a few instances that containers in
poor condition were "unloaded" on DoD. In response to this
type of problem, the Department of the Army is in the process
of drafting the Container Inspection Handbook, MIL-HDBK 138A
(AR) and a memorandum on Container Repair Guidelines.
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1. Lease Versus Buy
In 1987, the Institute of International Container
Lessors prepared an industry white paper to study the lease
versus buy decision carriers face in order to better under-
stand the process (The Lease -versus -Buy Decision for Contain-
er Equipment, Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc, Sep 1987). While
the study was commissioned for the commercial sector, many of
its facets hold true for the military transportation planner.
Despite the passage of time, the report still has valuable
insights into the decision making process.
The study by Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc. examined
the advantages and disadvantages of leasing. Figure 6 summa-
rizes the responses given in interviews conducted with major
worldwide shipping lines. The study was conducted in order to
ascertain attitudes about and the basis for the lease versus
buy decision.
Far and away the biggest perceived advantage to leas-
ing was the flexibility it brought in meeting equipment re-
quirements. Minimization of the risk of not having sufficient
equipment to handle demand was key. In keeping with the
desire for flexibility, the carriers did not conduct business
with only a handful of lessors, but rather across a number of
companies, normally between five and twelve. (The Lease
-
versus -Buy Decision for Container Equipment, Temple, Barker &




Perceived Advantages of Leasing Responses
Flexibility in equipment availability 82
Buffer stock for market growth and demand surges 44
Defer capital spending 38
Offset flow imbalances 31
Minimize inland repositioning 25
Hedge risks in market growth and new types 25
of equipment
Cheaper than repositioning empty containers 25
Avoid in-house administration cost for container 19
management
Facilitate interchange with other lines (particu- 7




Perceived Limitations of Leasing Responses
Leasing thought more expensive than owning 3 8
Lessor thought not always able to position inland 19
more efficiently than carrier
Lessor does not always have equipment in position 19
to meet short-term demand surges
Lessor cannot always reposition containers on un- 19
balanced trades more efficiently than carrier
Source: The Lease -versus -Buy Decision for Container Equipment, Temple,
Barker & Sloane, Inc. September 1987
Figure 6 Carrier's Perspective on Container Leasing
Many carriers maintain pools of containers to handle
the constant portion of their business and then lease con-
tainers for surge or unusual periods of demand. This enables
carriers to have sizable portions of their equipment pool
owned and maintained by lessors, thereby freeing capital
assets and deferring spending on such equipment. Costs asso-
ciated with obtaining and maintaining associated ancillary
container handling equipment and the administrative cost of
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overseeing and maintaining a container pool are also avoided.
{The Lease -versus -Buy Decision for Container Equipment, Tem-
ple, Barker & Sloane, Inc, p. 4, Sep 1987)
The advantages gained by leasing in the commercial
sector have many parallels in the Department of Defense. DoD
can be extremely flexible with the size of its container
inventory, yet it must take note of the relationships main-
tained by commercial carriers with a large number of lessors.
Lessors know their customer's needs and the lessee knows what
the lessor holds in assets. The costs of owning and maintain-
ing a huge container "buffer" fleet, that may be unused for
significant periods of time, could be tremendous. Leasing
offers the ability to avoid acquiring those containers and the
supporting infrastructure.
There are certainly costs associated with leasing
equipment. Questions of an overdependence on leased contain-
ers were raised in the study. A large reliance on leased
containers could cripple a carrier or DoD in the early stages
of increased demand, or a surge associated with a contingency,
until the containers could be delivered.
Many of the executives interviewed expressed views
that leasing expenses were actually higher than ownership when
costs associated with picking up and delivering the containers
and per diem charges were included. There were also "hidden"
costs. Instead of having administrative costs of maintaining
a container pool, there are administrative costs of maintain-
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ing a container rental negotiating and financing staff, having
representatives at the manufacturer's plant to supervise
compliance with ISO and specific military requirements, dam-
age, and costs of repositioning. Each of these costs must be
factored into the lease versus buy decision. (The Lease-
versus-Buy Decision for Container Equipment, Temple, Barker &
Sloane, Inc, p. 4, Sep 1987)
2. Alternative to Lease Versus Buy
USTRANSCOM is in the process of drafting a concept
known as the "Contingency Intermodal Contracts for Unit Move-
ments. " The basic philosophy of the plan is:
to work with the Army (and possibly USAF) to identify
CS/CSS units suitable for intermodal movement, develop
contracts, and have industry bid on contracts for specific
units. Industry would then plan directly with unit com-
manders to be able to accomplish mission. (Gary Adams,
USTRANSCOM Memorandum to MTMC, 2 Jun 19 92)
After suitable units had been identified for movement
on board containerships by FORSCOM, contingency contracts
could then be put in place. These contracts would address
areas such as the following:
• CONUS to OCONUS areas for movements (broad or specific)
.
• Cargo requirements of the unit. Door to Door service.
Origin outload, movement to SPOE, vessel onload, movement
to SPOD, vessel discharge, onward movement.
• Data and documentation standards. Interface requirements
between commercial system and DoD. Reporting requirements
throughout the transportation pipeline.
• Planning and exercise responsibilities for both government
and contractor.
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• Timeliness for deployment/execution at origin. Transit




• Companies work directly with Unit Commanders at the Unit's
installation during peacetime to develop movement plans.
Readiness and movement planning could be tested using
field exercises.
• U.S. companies or U.S. /Foreign consortium or cooperative
ventures would be allowed to bid. Any routes that re-
ceived no U.S. company bid would be open to foreign flag
companies.
• Allows industry to plan with DoD in peacetime. Allows
industry to know what movement requirements are. Removes
forces from deployment shipping during contingencies and
frees up RO/RO space for Combat units. (Gary Adams, US-
TRANSCOM Memo to MTMC, 2 Jun 1992)
This proposal is still in the conceptual stage, with
many questions yet to be answered. MTMC has concerns regard-
ing:
• Ability to stuf f /unstuf f containers
• Lack of facilities
• Drayage requirements to SPOE and responsibility thereof
and possible conflicts with combat units for same assets
• Units' proximity to unimproved ports and subsequent ef-
fects
• Tracking systems, i.e., use carrier system or Joint Con-
tainer Control Office (JCCO) system and interface compati-
bility requirements, especially with regards to the World-
wide Port System (WPS)
• Definition of in- theater ground transportation resources
and responsibilities
• Effect of hostile environment on carrier and rates
• Will ammunition be allowed through commercial ports?
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Political considerations of using foreign carriers from
both the U.S. and foreign country perspectives (Levine,
MTMC-HQ, Interview, June 1992)
D. SUMMARY
The Department of Defense has recognized the need to adapt
its shipping operations in order to access the commercial
container shipping industry. Containers have been declared to
be the preferred method of shipment. DoD directs containers
be utilized in order to reduced closure times. Reliance on
the commercial sector will be heavy, but as seen in Desert
Shield/Storm, the commercial capability is in place to respond
to the demand.
The commercial container market operates roughly in equi-
librium. While some carriers are increasing their fleets of
containers, others are reducing theirs. Individual companies
are small when compared to the entire market. When a contin-
gency arises and DoD seeks vast numbers of containers, the
market could easily shift to a "seller's market," where demand
significantly exceeds the available supply. This drives up
the costs of containers, whether purchased or leased. The
industry might not be able to respond immediately to the surge
in demand, and it may take some time to marshall the desired
containers, which further drives up prices.
Beth ownership and leasing have significant advantages and
disadvantages. Both have obvious and hidden costs. A large
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percentage of owned containers allows an independence in
response to both crisis and normal situations. This would
come at great expense due to the purchase and maintenance of
inventory and related infrastructure and does not appear to be
a financially viable alternative.
Leasing, on the other hand, allows flexibility in reduced
inventories, infrastructure and capital expenditures, however
it creates a dependency on the lessor and reduces response
flexibility and options. The most appropriate approach may be
like that of the commercial side - maintaining a base pool for
the steady requirements and the leasing of containers for
surge requirements.
Rapid mobilization plans for container assets and peace-
time visibility of those assets will be crucial to the success
of containerization of unit equipment. Contingency plans for
no-hassle contracting with commercial carriers must be put in
place. Visibility of container assets available from carriers
and of containers in transit is also critical to successful
incorporation of containers into surge deployments.
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V. CONTAINERS
Containers and the unitization of material have been
tremendously successful in the commercial world. This success
is due in part to the development of containers with a limited
number of compatible footprint sizes which are nevertheless
tailored for the shipment of commodities with a wide range of
distinguishing characteristics. For example, commercial
containers with 40 foot x 8 foot and 20 foot x 8 foot foot-
prints include standard boxes, refrigerated boxes, open top
boxes, hatch top dry bulk containers with gravity discharge,
tank containers and flatracks. To help deal with different
commodity densities, the standard box containers also vary in
height from 8 to 9% feet. Furthermore, two 20 foot long units
can often be treated as a single 40 foot unit during movement.
This specialization within an overall standardized approach
has enabled commercial container carriers to efficiently meet
the service needs for a large range of shippers.
The variety of containers in service in commercial markets
has a counterpart in the Department of Defense. The goal of
DoD is to have ready access to the commercial market without
the need for modifications to equipment, however, DoD has many
requirements that would not fully utilize a full -sized con-
tainer. Additionally, there is a need for small, highly
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mobile command- type units that can be transported and set up
very quickly.
A. DoD INVENTORY
The DoD inventory has a wide variety of containers and
capacities that meet its military specifications (MILSPECS)
.
The following containers are currently in the inventory (1992
Container System Hardware Status Report)
:
• MILVAN (Ammunition Restraint)
• MILVAN (General Cargo)
• 20 foot ISO End Opening
• 20 foot ISO Side-Opening
• Refrigerated
• 20 foot Half-Height
• ISO Tactical Shelter
• Mobile Facility
• TRICON - Shipping/Storage (Bulk and Configured)
• EDSS Quadruple Container (QUADCON)
• Palletized Load System (PLS) Logistics
• 20 foot Flatrack
• 40 foot Heavy Duty Flatrack
• Load and Roll Pallet (LRP)
In addition to the MILSPEC containers sited above, Mili-
tary Traffic Management Command (MTMC) has requested National
Stock Numbers (NSN) and Standard Line Item Numbers (LIN) for
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the following non-MILSPEC containers (Gore, MTMCHQ, Memo, Dec
1991)
:
• End opening 8 foot x 8 foot x 20 foot dry cargo
• End opening 8 foot x 8% foot x 20 foot dry cargo
• Side opening 8 foot x 8 foot x 20 foot
• Half-height 8 foot x 4U feet x 20 foot
• Load and Roll Pallet
• Flatracks
The following is a description of the MILSPEC container
types identified in the 1992 Container System Hardware Status
Report
:
MILVAN (Ammunition Restraint) - ANSI/ISO container
equipped with restraint hardware capable of handling approxi-
mately 20 long tons of ammunition. See Figure 7.
MILVAN (General Cargo) - ANSI/ISO container capable of
handling up to 20 long tons of general cargo. It is used
mainly to transport and temporarily store military cargo. See
Figure 8
.
20 Foot ISO End Opening - used to transport ammunition.
It is capable of being transported by commercial or military
means. The door end corner posts have been modified with
angle iron to enhance blocking and bracing required for ammu-
nition. There is no permanent restraint system as in the
Ammunition Restraint MILVAN. See Figure 9.
20 Foot Side-Opening - ISO container with two double doors
located on one side of the container which open fully to allow
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complete, unobstructed access to the contents. It is equipped
with internal tie-down rings to secure cargo. It can be
transported by both commercial and military means. See Figure
10.
Refrigerated - transports, temporarily stores, and assists
in the distribution of temperature- sensitive cargo. It is a
commercial design modified to military specifications. It
conforms to ISO requirements. See Figure 11.
20 Foot Half -Height - 20 feet X 8 feet X 4.25 feet. The
half -height has fixed sides, open top, and one drop- end to
allow access to contents. The containers come with bows and
tarpaulins to use as covers during transit and storage. Used
primarily for drummed oils, lubricants and ammunition. See
Figure 12
.
ISO Tactical Shelter - a presized, transportable structure
designed for live- in, work-in, or container capability. It
comes in expandable or non- expandable versions. Expandable
shelters come in one or two-sided expandable models. All
shelters are available in 60 and 100 amp versions. See Figure
13.
Mobile Facility - rigid walled ISO container used primar-
ily to house aviation weapons systems maintenance, tactical
operation, logistical, and administrative functions. These
containers come in several configurations. Used primarily by
the Navy and Marine Corps, but also by other services. See
Figure 14
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TRICON - all steel construction with standard ISO corner
fittings with 3 -way forklift access. It comes as a bulk
carrier or configured with cabinets and shelves. Three of
these containers coupled together form a nominal 2 foot mod-
ule. See Figure 15.
EDSS QUADCONS - consists of two types of containers; one
suitable for air transportation and the other by ground/ocean
transportation. The ground container will be fully ISO com-
patible. It will have doors on both ends to allow for full
access to the contents, even when joined together. Four
containers will be capable of being joined together to form a
20 foot equivalent ISO container. See Figure 16 and 17.
Procurement is slated to begin in Fiscal Year (FY) 94.
The EDSS QUADCON is a second generation QUADCON. First
generation (1984) QUADCONs have ISO corner fittings and,
except for height, have the same dimensions as a 20 foot ISO
container. First generation QUADCONs are used by the Marine
Corps and are part of the "Marine Corps Family of Intermediate
Size Containers." The difference between first and second
generation QUADCONs is small. Both are 96 inches in length
and 82 inches in height. The EDSS QUADCON is 5 7# inches wide
vice 57.38 for the original QUADCON. Cargo capacity of first
generation QUADCONs is 8,200 pounds vice 8,000 pounds for the
EDSS QUADCON.
Palletized Load System (PLS) Logistics - The Palletized
Load System (PLS) is "the Army's approach to overcome" ammur-i-
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tion logistics "material handling and transportation short-
falls associated with delivering Class V (ammunition) materi-
als to combat units." The PLS system "consists of a standard
mobility heavy duty truck chassis, an integral hydraulic load
handling mechanism, a compatible trailer, and a number of
flatracks." The truck is self-loading and unloading.
The PLS Logistics concept is intended to demonstrate a
direct link between PLS and strategic transportation assets.
There are two PLS Logistic concepts: the Hooklift Interface
Kit (HIK) and the Enhanced PLS Flatrack (EPF) . The HIK en-
ables a PLS truck to directly lift, transport, and deliver any
commercial 20 foot container with the assistance of an X- frame
and a hook that attaches to a support frame. The EPF is based
on a 20 foot flatrack modified with PLS. The EPF resulted in
the development of the Ammunition Container (AMCON) and is
envisioned to be able to transport ammunition without addi-
tional handling between CONUS and the battlefield. See Figure
18, 19 and 20.
20 Foot Flatrack - a 20 foot container with open sides and
top to allow easy accessibility to material. Used to trans-
port bulky, high cube type items. See Figure 21.
40 Foot Heavy Duty Flatrack - developed to provide a
breakbulk capability to containerships in order to carry heavy
and/or outsized cargo. There are two versions: 67.2 short
ton and 72 short tons. The flatrack is a steel frame, decked
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over and fitted with tiedown points. The corner posts fold
down to facilitate stacking and storage. See Figure 22.
Load and Roll Pallet (LRP) - a steel frame platform
equipped with rollers. It measures 89 inches wide x 227
inches long x 10 inches high and fits inside a standard 20
foot ANSI/ISO container. It is used to unload a complete load
of four Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Pods or four Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Pods from an end opening
container. It essentially unitizes missiles to allow access
to the intermodal transport network. See Figure 23.
A potential militarily-useful container, not currently in
the inventory, entails a proposed modification of the half-
height container by Mr. George Saunders of Military Sealift
Command. With this modification, the half-height container
can be fitted with an expansion frame to allow it to have
"full" dimensions, thereby offering four distinct advantages
over other forms of containers: a) it can accommodate high-
density (e.g., ammunition, drummed POL) in its unmodified
configuration, b) with an expansion frame, it is capable of
accommodating irregular and unit -type cargo, c) with a tarpau-
lin fitted, it can serve as a closed dry cargo container, and
d) after devanning, the expansion frame can be removed, se-
cured in the container, and the unit positioned for retrograde
movement. (Saunders, Adapting Containers to Military Require-
ments . 1986) It appears this design offers a range of cargo
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accommodation prof iles that "standard" containers do not. See
Figure 24.
Figure 7 MILVAN (Ammunition Restraint)
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Figure 8 MILVAN (General Cargo!
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Figure 9 20 Foot ISO End Opening
62
Figure 10 20 Foot ISO Side-Opening
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Figure 12 20 Foot Half-Height
Figure 13 ISO Tactical Shelter
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SIDE OPENING MF TYPE A
DOUBLE END DOOR REMOVABLE SIDE WALL
SIDE OPENING MF TYPE B
(MODIFIED)
SIDE OPENING MF TYPE B
REMOVABLE SIDE WALLS
REMOVABLE PANELS
INTEGRATION UNIT SIDE OPENING MF TYPE C




Figure 15 Triple Container (TRICON)
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Figure 16 QUADCON
Figure 17 Assembled QUADCON TEU
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.Figure 18 Palletized Load System (PLS) Truck
Figure 19 HIK System
69
Figure 2 Ammunition Container
(AMCON)















Figure 22 Heavy Duty Flatrack
3h
Figure 23 Load and Roll Pallet (LRP)
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End Frame
Figure 24 Half -Height with Expansion Frame
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1. Army-Owned Container Inventory
Table 7 shows the Army- owned container inventory as
reported by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
that was available in June 1992. The majority of containers
are identified as available for ammunition handling. MTMC
reported that militarily useful containers used during Desert
Shield/Storm were being identified by Forces Command (FORSCOM)
so that MTMC could obtain International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) certification. The identified contain-
ers could then be included in the container inventory, if
deemed appropriate. No plans were then in place to procure
Table 7 ARMY -OWNED CONTAINER FLEET
MTMC CONTAINER INVENTORY AS OF JUNE 1991
Current Assets
MILVAN Commer- Half Side
(CADS)* cial* Height* Opener*
Ammo Contingency
Load/Roll (General
Pallet a Cargo) b
5,409 4,850 1,200 625 500 979
* Available for ammunition use. Total: 12, 084
a. This is not a container, nor does it conform to ISO standards. These
are used to unitize and further protect missiles inside boxes during the
shipping process.
b. This type of container may be used to
leased for general fleet use.
transport ammunition when re-
additional containers. (Memo MTPL-M (500-5a), MTMC, 24 Jul 92)
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2. Equipment Deployment and Storage Systems (EDSS)
Non-standard and locally fabricated storage aids have
proliferated throughout the force. Many existing contain-
ers are poorly designed, hard to maintain, and do not
provide the degree of containerization required for rapid
and efficient movement of a deployed force. The concept,
as part of the Army Containerization Master Plan, will
provide for standardized deployment/storage systems capa-
ble of strategic and tactical delivery via both surface
and air transportation modes.
Prepackaged unit equipment and supplies in standard de-
ployment/storage systems is the preferred method of opera-
tion as military strategy evolves from a policy of forward
presence to a CONUS-based contingency force. (Concept
Statement for the Equipment Deployment and Storage Sys-
tems, U.S. Army Quartermaster School, April 1992)
The U.S. Army Quartermaster School issued the above
statement in April 1992 on the Equipment Deployment and Stor-
age Systems concept. The school found that "suitable storage
aids" had been lacking over the years, and in an effort to
solve the problem, units at the local level had fabricated
their own "storage aids." This resulted in "a proliferation"
of "non-standard" storage aids which were hard to maintain,
did not "provide the degree of containerization required", and
in some cases, actually hindered their transportability using
different transportation modes. The hampering of the trans-
portability of the aids degraded the speed with and methods by
which units could deploy, thereby "impeding deployment readi-
ness and force closure."
In an effort to overcome these problems, the Equipment
Deployment and Storage System program was established. The
system is envisioned to:
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provide an increased capability for combat, combat support
{CS)
,
and combat service support (CSS) units to preload
equipment and store and distribute Authorized Stockage
List (ASL)
, basic, prescribed and operational loads, and
equipment (Concept Statement for the Equipment Deployment
and Storage Systems, U.S. Army Quartermaster Center &
School, 28 April 1992) .
Two types of EDSS "modules" will be employed, one for surface
transportation and the other for air transportation. These
modules are specifically limited to the deployment and storage
required for unit deployments. They are not designed for
sustainment operations.
The surface modules are designed for sea and ground
transportation. They are designated Quadruple Containers
(QUADCONs) . Each container is 96 inches deep by 57.38 inches
wide by 82 inches high, lockable, weatherproof, reusable, and
has a gross weight of 10,000 pounds. The container has doors
on both ends to allow full access and can be outfitted with
shelves and compartments, if necessary. Four containers can
be stacked and locked together to form a standard 8 foot x 20
foot ANSI/ISO container while maintaining access to all four
units
.
EDSS modules can be used in a warehousing capacity and
can be used as a more permanent form of storage. They quickly
can be made ready for deployment. The modules are an effort
to have units operate with containers as a normal course of
business so that container usage will not be unfamiliar.
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B. SUMMARY
The DoD container inventory includes a wide range of
container types in order to allow flexibility during opera-
tions. However, the majority of containers are to be used in
the transportation of ammunition. The containerization of
ammunition is a major component of surge deployment container
requirements. Significant effort has been expended on devel-
oping containers that are readily connective between DoD and
commercial carriers.
Connectivity with commercial carriers will be key to the
use of containers and containerships during surge deployments.
Units that routinely operate with containers can readily
deploy by this method. As evidenced by the use of mobile
facilities and tactical shelters, living and working spaces
can be "containerized" as well. This will serve to increase
the connectivity and compatibility with the commercial con-
tainer industry.
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VI. CONTAINED TRACKING AND VISIBILITY
A. BACKGROUND
Container management was a significant problem during
Operations Desert Shield/Storm. It became nearly impossi-
ble for personnel in- theater to identify the contents of
the incoming containers. In fact, of 40,000 containers
sent to the theater, 25,000 had to opened and sorted
through to identify the contents. (Department of the
Army, Total Distribution Action Plan, p. 15, May 1992)
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated the
need for intransit visibility of sustainment material and
personnel replacements being moved in support of opera-
tions. An essential requirement for commanders, trans-
porters, shippers and receivers was to know where in the
distribution system units, individuals, unit equipment,
critical repair parts, weapon systems, or sustainment
supplies are located. The basic function of all systems
that provide a degree of intransit visibility is to assist
in managing change. As priorities change, intransit vis-
ibility provides the necessary tool to adjust flow in the
supply pipeline. (Department of the Army, Total Distribu-
tion Action Plan, p. 29, May 1992)
The lack of visibility is directly related to the lack of
confidence in the supply system. This leads to duplicate
requisitions, needlessly straining both the industrial
base and the distribution system. Duplication of requisi-
tions, diversion of Class I shipments, replacement units
impacted by sealift diversions, and airlift reprioriti-
zation are examples of how the lack of intransit visibili-
ty impacted negatively upon theater operations. This
impact also extended to CONUS and Europe. However, the
sophisticated communications network in CONUS and in Eu-
rope facilitated a greater degree of visibility than was
available in the SWA theater since some intransit data and
queries could be passed to CONUS based systems. (Depart-
ment of the Army, Total Distribution Action Plan, p. 29,
May 1992)
The lack of intransit visibility can be tied to a number
of factors: 1) lack of discipline in the process to
document cargo and close out transactions; 2) automated
systems which either were not fielded at all or did not
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have adequate capacity; 3) inadequate communications; 4)
the lack of a comprehensive intransit visibility data
base; 5) the lack of detail currently required in some
documentation regulations; and 6) inadequate supporting
force structure in the theater early. (Department of the
Army, Total Distribution Action Plan, p. 29, May 1992)
A key component of intransit visibility is the ability to
query the distribution system to determine the status of
requisitions, receipts, arrivals, departures, diversions,
and the identity of carriers. While a number of supply
and transportation systems contain some of the needed
data, currently no comprehensive intransit visibility data
base with a supporting communications architecture exists
which contains all the data necessary to answer such que-
ries. The lack of intransit visibility of items led to an
inability to identify when a needed shipment would be
delivered, to divert/redirect shipments in the corps and
theater, or even to identify the contents of containers.
Stocks moving through the distribution network cannot be
intercepted to change the consignee or to redirect to a
consignee that has moved to another support activity or
location. (Department of the Army, Total Distribution
Action Plan, p. 33, May 1992)
The Army's Logistics Control Activity (LCA) Logistics
Intelligence File (LIF) consolidates some of the needed
information, but the LIF is hampered by its batch process-
ing times and those of the source data systems. In addi-
tion, incomplete information is provided by these source
systems. MILSTAMP does not require that all pertinent
transportation data, such as SPOD receipt and lift, be
forwarded to the LCA, and there is insufficient detail in
some transportation documentation to meet the requirements
of theater item managers . Cumbersome documentation proce-
dures at the source and receiving activities also cause
incomplete data to be generated. Without complete ship-
ment, receipt and lift data, the Logistics Control Activi-
ty (LCA) , which is responsible for management of the Army
material pipeline, is operating blind. Only limited req-
uisition status information is available. The large vol-
ume of traffic during a crisis situation exacerbates this
problem. (Department of the Army, Total Distribution
Action Plan, p. 33, May 1992)
The essential characteristic that is being looked for is
the ability to query the distribution system at any point
along its path (critical nodes) and determine status in a
matter of minutes or several hours, not in 24, 48, or 72
hour bursts as is the case with the LIF. Additionally,
the desire is to be able to accomplish a tracking capabil-
78
ity similar to what industry currently does with its hard-
ware, software, and communication systems. The military
system as it exists today cannot respond immediately to a
simple request to locate a particular unit, piece of equi-
pment, or spare part. (Department of the Army, Total Dis-
tribution Action Plan, p. 33, May 1992)
B. TOTAL VISIBILITY CONCERNS
The previous section highlighted some of the difficulties
experienced in tracking containers and container contents and
pointed out areas of significant concern that require correc-
tive efforts. It also brought to light the type of informa-
tion and its timeliness required by commanders in order for
them to make sound tactical decisions. The perspective,
though, was more from the consumer of lift, such as deploying
forces, than from that of the provider of lift. The lack of
visibility of container assets experienced by forces in South-
west Asia was also experienced by the providers of lift and it
was similarly frustrating.
In Chapter III of this thesis, the differentiation between
"strategic" and "unit-owned" containers was noted. Briefly,
strategic containers are viewed as part of the Defense Trans-
portation System (DTS) container pool and are merely used as
platforms for the movement of material. Once a lift has been
completed, the container is returned to the DTS pool for
reuse. Unit -owned containers are listed as unit equipment
(carried on the Automated Unit Equipment List [AUEL] and as an
asset in the Unit Property Book) and remain with the unit
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while it is on its mission. The distinction between contain-
ers, as either strategic or unit- owned, impacts the tracking
and visibility of those containers by the transportation
providers
.
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and Military
Sealift Command (MSC) do not have visibility of all Unit
Equipment containers. Another difficulty arises when com-
mands, in response to a contingency, procure or lease their
own containers to support their deployment. These containers
essentially become unit equipment, and are invisible to MTMC
and MSC (Levine, MTMCHQ, Interview, Jul 1992) . To the extent
that MTMC and MSC are unaware of these containers, then esti-
mates of lift requirements may be too low. Considering the
number of commands affected by a mobilization, the quantity of
augmented containers can swell the number of containers re-
quiring lift by considerable proportions. The problem of
invisible containers was experienced during Operation Desert
Shield by MTMC and MSC.
C . TRACKING
1. Commercial System
Commercial carriers usually operate on a "hub and
spoke" system. This entails receiving/discharging nodes
(spokes) feeding containers to and receiving containers from
transshipment points (hubs) . Containers are transported to
hubs for consolidation with other containers going in the same
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direction or for delivery to the customer. The outbound
containers are then lifted by a vessel to another hub, possi-
bly broken apart again to be further transshipped through
other hubs on other vessels, broken down at the hub nearest
the customer, delivered to the node nearest the customer, and
ultimately delivered to the customer.
U.S. carriers assign voyage document (voydoc) numbers
to individual vessel moves, many times "by port." When con-
tainers are transshipped, voyage document numbers do not
change, but vessels do. Commercial information management
systems are extremely well suited for tracking containers
through these types of moves. However, using commercial
carriers to transport military containers causes a loss of
visibility to the military transportation information manage-
ment system because of successive transshipments. (Lennon,
MTMC-TEA, Interview, Jul 1992)
To illustrate the problem transshipments cause DoD,
consider the following example: Commercial container vessel
1 leaves a CONUS SPOE, port A, with a container slated to go
to Dammam, the SPOD. The vessel is assigned voydoc XYZ.
Vessel 1 is manifested by DoD for delivery from Port A to Dam-
mam. The SPOD is notified that vessel 1 left port with con-
tainers destined for delivery there. Voydoc XYZ is included
as part of the container's TCN. Vessel 1 proceeds from port
A to CONUS port B, the firm's container hub, where the con-
tainer is consolidated with other containers destined for the
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same geographic area and is put on board vessel 2. The carri-
er notes the change from vessel 1 to vessel 2 in their track-
ing system, but the SPOD is not directly notified. Loss of
visibility starts here. Vessel 2 proceeds to the Mideast and
arrives at port C, the firm's Mideastern hub. At this hub,
the container is transferred to vessel 3, a feeder vessel, for
delivery to Dammam. Again, the carrier notes the change in
vessel, but the SPOD is not directly notified. Vessel 3
arrives in Dammam with the container plus other containers
that started out in similar fashion. The military expects and
prepares for vessel 1 and the containers it left the SPOE
with, but vessel 3 arrives carrying some of those containers
plus other containers similarly transshipped. (Priber, MTMC-
HQ, Interview, Mar 1993) This transshipment proces? is very
efficient for the carriers, but causes the container to be
"lost" from the military's point of view.
As a result of this type of visibility problem, the
container operations conducted in support of the Somalia
relief effort were controlled by Military Sealift Command
(MSC) from the port of Alexandria, Egypt. All containers
destined for Somalia had to be transshipped through Alexandria
because vessel size was restricted in Somalia ports and small-
er vessels were needed. MSC set up a field office in Alexan-
dria to specifically manifest the feeder vessels headed for
Somalia so that problems of the type described in the previous
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paragraph would not experienced again. (Priber, MTMCHQ,
Interview, Mar 1993)
Commercial carrier manifests are also significantly
different from DoD manifests. Military manifests add no value
to the carrier's tracking system, and are not referred to on
the commercial manifest or voyage documents. Since DoD does
not track by voydoc and does not have access to the commercial
tracking system, the material suffers a further loss of visi-
bility to the military transportation system. (Lennon, MTMC-
TEA, Interview, Jul 1992)
2 . Department of Defense System
The logistics community has developed a large number of
information systems that are essentially "little islands"
of information and do not exchange data between them.
(Erbertowski, p. 29, April 1992)
DoD has developed a wide range of transportation
information management systems to support and plan for both
peacetime and wartime missions. The following is a list of
transportation information management systems currently af-
fecting sealift operations and is provided so that the reader
may grasp the immensity of the Defense Transportation System
(Logistics Automation Master Plan, June 1992)
:
• ACI - Automated Carrier Interface
• ASPUR - Automated System for Processing Unit Requirements
• AUEL - Automated Unit Equipment List
• CFM - CONUS Freight Management
• CODES - Computerized Deployment System
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• COMPASS - Computerized Movement Planning and Status System
• DAMMS-CMM - Department of the Army Movements Management
System- Cargo Movements Module
• DAMMS-MPM - Department of the Army Movements Management
System-Movements Planning Module
• DAMMS-R - Department of the Army Movements Management
System- Redesign
• DASPS-E - Department of the Army Standard Port System-
Enhanced
• FMCS - Freight Movement Control System
• IBS - Integrated Booking System
• ITV - Intransit Visibility
• JOPES - Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
• JOPS - Joint Operation Planning System
• LIF - Logistics Intelligence File
• MAPS II - Mobility Analysis and Planning System
• METS II - Mechanized Export Traffic System
• MOBSCOPE - Mobilization Shipments Configured for Opera-
tion, Planning and Execution
• SEACOP - Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System
• TC ACCIS - Transportation Coordinator Automated Command
and Control Information System
• TERMS - Terminal Management System
The following new systems are proposed:
• MASS - MOBCON Automated Support System
• MOBSS - Mobilization Support System
• SEASTRAT - Sealift Strategic Planning System
• STA - Strategic Transportation Analysis
• WPS - Worldwide Port System
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Each of the aforementioned systems was developed with
specific strategic objectives ±n mind, however, as a whole,
their massive organization contributes to the loss of visibil-
ity through a lack of connectivity. In addition to the com-
plexity of the system in and of itself, user interface also
plays a significant role in the effectiveness of the informa-
tion management systems.
Many of these systems are not "user friendly" and are
hard to use. For example, JOPES is a classified, CINC level
operational planning tool which determines lift requirements
using Unit Line Numbers (ULN's) , which are not sourced back to
a UIC. Much of the planning done with JOPES affects TC ACCIS,
which is used to determine actual lift requirements. TC ACCIS
is unclassified and uses Unit Identification Codes (UIC's).
Each UIC can have several ULN's (part air and part surface)
.
(Fox, ODSCLOG, Interview, Jul 1992) Figures 25 through 28
illustrate the interrelationships between the existing and
proposed systems.
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Figure 25 Transportation Automation Fiscal Year 92-93
Source: Logistics Automation Master Plan June 1992
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Figure 26 Transportation Automation Fiscal Year S4-98
Source: Logistics Automation Master Plan, June 1992
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I I OTHER SERVICES
AALPS - Automated Airload Planning System DASPS-E
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Figure 27 Near Term Integrated Unit Move DTS/JOPES
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Pigure 2 8 Mid Term Integrated Unit Move DTS/JOPES
Source: Logistics Automation Master Plan, June 1992
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3 . Documentation
Proper documentation is crucial for accurate and
timely in-transit visibility. In-transit visibility require-
ments exist for both the container and the contents. The
problem with lack of visibility starts not with the use of
containers, but with the lack of proper content documentation,
known as backup documents. The missing link in the visibili-
ty of in- transit material during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm was not the containers themselves, but rather the
lack of adequate documentation of contents (backup documents)
(CAPT Hinson, MTMCHQ, Interview, Jul 1992) .
Individual containers could be tracked in the DoD
system with some degree of accuracy, but not in real time.
The Joint Container Control Division (JCCD) in Bayonne, New
Jersey tracks only ammunition containers by the DoD Activity
Address Code (DODAAC) , basically a UIC, and container serial
number. From a DoD documentation perspective, when a command
requests the status or whereabouts of a container from MTMC,
MTMC must query MSC, which then must query the ship for loca-
tion. The ship then responds to MSC. MSC then responds to
MTMC, and MTMC finally reports back to the requesting command.
Each container is assigned a Transportation Control Number
(TCN)
.
The TCN does not change when a transshipment occurs,
and is tracked fairly accurately by the transportation infor-
mation management system. Problems do arise, however, with
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inaccurate TCN's. They can cause material to be misrouted or
become unidentifiable. TCN's can be assigned at the home
installation, but also by consolidation point . (Ford, MTMCHQ,
Interview, Jul 92)
The container content manifesting process is also
crucial to in- transit visibility. This step is still done
manually by physically typing entries for shipping documents
for each item in the container either on a document or into a
computer which then generates a document. The manifest is
then built from these documents. The current Military Stan-
dard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP DoD
4500. 32R) manual does not require every field to be annotated
in order for the shipment to move. This can result in very
generic manifests being produced. It should be noted that the
decision to do only the minimum MILSTAMP requirements was a
conscious one made "by all concerned" in order to get material
moving quickly (LTC Cella, ODSCLOG, Interview, Jul 1992) .
The manifests are then used as the basis for the Container
Content Report which is supposed to precede the container to
the SPOD. In all too many cases, the report "goes nowhere" or
the "cargo arrives before the manifest" (Ford, MTMCHQ, Inter-





As can be seen by the interrelationships between
individual systems, even a knowledgeable person could quickly
become overwhelmed by the immense scope of the system and the
ripple effects which changes in one system can have on others.
Ebertowski and Sweeney noted in 1992 that an Israeli observer
had stated: "U.S. weapons are designed by engineers for
engineers whereas Soviet weapons are designed for the combat
soldier." (Ebertowski, p. 31, 1992). The same sentiments
were echoed by Colonel Fields of Military Sealift Command when
he noted that transportation management information systems
are "just too complicated for 'Snuffy' to use." "Snuffy" is
jargon for the normal, average soldier. (Col. Fields, MSCHQ,
Interview, Jul 1992). Both of these observers noted that
technology can be overwhelming and that "simplicity is as
relevant to information management systems as it is to combat
operations." (Ebertowski, p. 31, 1992)
The need for real time feedback to commanders is quite
clear, however many of the transportation information manage-
ment systems are of 1960's technology. Tracking by Radio Fre-
quency (RF) has been used on some shipments, however this
method has been reserved for very high visibility cargoes and
some hazardous materials. (Ford, MTMCHQ, Interview, Jul 1992)
Bar coding of container contents is also well within current
technological capabilities, but the earliest bar coded ac-
counting systems for container contents may be a few years
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away. (Levine, MTMCHQ, Interview, Jul 1992) Logistics Appli-
cations of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS) and
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) are currently available and
in use.
As new generations of computers come into service,
they are intended to be incorporated into the transportation
information management system. The automating of source data
is viewed as a critical key to obtaining total in- transit
visibility. Objectives for the modernization and real-time
interface of various components of the DTS are divided into
three sets of objectives: 1) Near Term -- Fiscal Years 92
and 93, 2) Mid- term -- Fiscal Years 94 through 98, and 3)
Long-Range -- Fiscal Year 99 through 2008. The Near-Term
objectives are:
• Improve rapid deployment capability and movement command
and control through development and fielding of integrated
systems
.
• Improve the availability and quality of standard transpor-
tation data and continue efforts toward data standardiza-
tion. (Logistics Automation Master Plan, p. 8-2, June 92)
Mid-Term objectives are:
• Complete interface or integration of transportation auto-
mated information systems. Continue fielding and provide
training through classroom and automated tutorials.
• Field the following transportation automated systems:
**TC ACCIS/AALPS
Department of the Army Management System
(DAMMS)




• Incorporate the concept of Total Asset Visibility (TAV)
into existing and evolving transportation information
systems
.
• Support USTRANSCOM's efforts to develop the Global Trans-
portation Network (GTN) as the vehicle to update JOPES
with execution data. (Logistics Automation Master Plan,
p. 8-3, Jun 1992)
The Long-Range objective is:
• Modernize/enhance transportation automated systems, as
required to meet the on- going evolutionary changes neces-
sitated by the concepts included with Air-Land Battle-Fu-
ture:
**Reduce reliance on paper documentation
through the use of micro- circuit technology in
logistic applications (MITLA) in transporta-
tion automation. Replace LOGMARS with MITLA.
Incorporate automated interfaces across fun-
ctional lines, e.g., the provision of battle-
field intelligence to assist transportation
planners in the formulation of movement plans.
(Logistics Automation Master Plan, p. 8-3, Jun
1992)
5. Forces Command Container Action Plan
FORSCOM is currently drafting its container action
plan. Containers are envisioned to deploy with unit equipment
"to ensure unit integrity." All unit equipment containers,
whether unit -owned or commercially obtained, will be identi-
fied in a unit's movement plan. Unit equipment containers
would be designated as either critical or non- critical , de-
pending on if the contents would "affect a unit's ability to
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perform its mission." (Draft, FORSCOM Container Action Plan,
p. 2, Jan 199 3)
Unit equipment containers will have a Shipment Unit
Number (SUN)
,
UIC, and container number clearly marked "on the
front door." A -waterproof shipping tag (DD 1371-1) will be
affixed as well. A packing list (DD 1371) will be inside each
container. FORSCOM directs MTMC to "constantly" monitor the
in- transit visibility of the containers. Due to problems with
loss of visibility when transshipping occurred during Opera-
tion Desert Shield/Desert Storm, transshipping will not be
authorized. FORSCOM intends that containers be shipped di-
rectly to the SPOD, and will direct that MTMC ensure contracts
include this requirement. (Draft, FORSCOM Container Action
Plan, p. 2, Jan 1993)
D. SUMMARY
The logistical system has proven itself capable of deliv-
ering massive amounts of material thousands of miles from our
shores, yet when tasked to provide an answer to a "simple"
question of the whereabouts of a particular piece of equip-
ment, the answer many times requires days. The problem of
loss of visibility begins before the material starts its
journey. Timely and accurate visibility of in- transit materi-
al begins by ensuring that initial documentation is fully and
correctly completed. Without it, material will quickly become
lost in the pipeline.
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The task of producing all of the "hard" documents required
to support movements of this scope is tremendous. New tech-
nologies must be developed and brought on line to assist in
this endeavor. Connectivity between transportation informa-
tion management systems must occur in order to be able to
access the true potential of the speed and capabilities of the
current generation of computers. The transportation informa-
tion management systems must also be "user friendly" so that
people like "Snuffy" are able to easily operate them.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department of Defense (DoD) has directed the utiliza-
tion of containers as the preferred method of shipment for
defense cargo. The use of containers is expected to produce
cost reductions and economies of scale similar to those pro-
duced in the commercial sector. Amove to containers, whether
in peace or war, and away from traditional breakbulk opera-
tions carries with it the cost of new material handling meth-
ods and equipment, plus the retraining of material handlers.
Retraining is an especially important task, both for those
who work with containers, such as cargo handling units, and
for fighting units which must operate with them. Military
contingency operations in the foreseeable future will entail
the utilization of CONUS -based forces which may be rapidly
deployed to crisis areas in different parts of the world. The
Army Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP) goal, founded on a CONUS-
based forces strategy, requires force closure of three divi-
sions, two by sea and one by air, within thirty days, and the
full Contingency Corps within seventy five days. In order for
this strategy to be effective, forces must be tailored to fit
this new mission. This requires the Contingency Corps to be
able to deploy rapidly, effectively, and efficiently, using
multiple modes, as well as be readily self-sustaining. The
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use of containers is a significant component of the ability to
fulfill this new mission.
Container use must be phased into operational units in the
course of normal operating procedures. Reserve units must
also become familiar with containerization requirements.
Container use must not be new or unique, but rather common-
place. Containers can serve as temporary storage facilities
and also as work and living spaces. A rapid deployment force
operating, by design, out of containers will have a much
faster response time than a force that must first obtain and
then stuff and unstuff containers.
The ability to obtain containers is also a crucial compo-
nent of the Rapid Deployment strategy. The units designated
as surge deployers should be equipped with sufficient contain-
ers to conduct the deployment, or they must have immediate
access to a supply of containers. The Department of Defense
and commercial carriers need to work together so that DoD may
have visibility of available commercial assets for planning
purposes and have ready access to them should a contingency
arise. Contracting methods must be modified so that containers
may be leased or procured virtually immediately upon receiving
orders to begin to deploy. Valuable time will be lost if con-
tainers are not quickly and readily accessible.
Maintaining large fleets of containers to be used primari-
ly for contingencies will be too expensive. The large cost of
the containers, the associated material handling equipment,
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and the required maintenance, would be incurred without sig-
nificant benefit if no contingencies arise; most of the con-
tainers would ostensibly wait for a crisis to occur. The use
of unit -owned containers is recommended for the initial desig-
nated surge deployers, with leased strategic containers used
for the later deploying sustainment and resupply forces.
Planning for rapid deployment contingencies will be criti-
cal. During the last three major contingencies, Time- Phased
Force Development Data (TPFDD) -planned scenarios did not
resemble the real crisis. New plans were essentially devel-
oped as the situation unfolded. This has led some in the
transportation community to question the validity of the TPFDD
process and the transportation requirements built around these
plans. The sealift providers must have a reliable means of
determining the quantity of sealift required. Planning sys-
tems are needed that are user friendly and have connectivity
with other major players in defense transportation.
In order to deploy more rapidly, maintain increased unit
integrity, plus have the ability to conduct operations upon
arrival at the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) , vehicles will
very likely be transported with full combat loads. Ammunition
will be a critical requirement and has been acknowledged as
having great gains through containerization. Much effort has
already been expended in the study of containerization of
ammunition, and as figures in this thesis indicate, a sizable
proportion of DoD-use containers will be for this purpose.
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Connectivity with the commercial system for the containeriza-
tion and transport of ammunition is observed with the use of
ammunition containers (AMCON's), Load and Roll pallets (LRP)
,
half -heights, commercial TEU's, and the Palletized Loading
System (PLS)
.
A critical lesson learned from Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm was the need to increase Combat Support (CS)
and Combat Service Support (CSS) levels during the earliest
stages of an operation. These echelons are absolutely essen-
tial in order to have an infrastructure in place and ready for
the support of combat operations. CS and CSS units have much
higher percentages of equipment that is containerizable than
combat units. For this reason, during surge periods, contain-
erships are a logical method with which to deploy these units,
while the Roll -On/Roll -Of f and FSS's are reserved to transport
combat units, which have high percentages of rolling stock.
Deploying CS and CSS units in the first surge will help
establish an intermodal network. Intermodal infrastructure is
necessary for successful containerization . Container support
infrastructure will be a high value target to the enemy. The
lack of an intact intermodal infrastructure will seriously
degrade the effectiveness of containers and the ability of our
forces to conduct their mission. It is essential that the
support infrastructure be in place in order to support the
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